While he continues to inspire think-pieces, his play — including his base stealing — has disappointed. Hamilton, likely the sport's fastest player, is 23 for 30 on stolen-base tries (through June 7). Good, but not transcendent.
Even with withered efficiency, Hamilton remains eager to run. Hamilton has attempted a steal in almost 60 percent of his stolen-base opportunities (defined by Baseball-Reference as times on first or second with an empty base ahead), the most among players with at least 30 chances.
How unusual is that? Only one other player has gone in more than 40 percent of his opportunities; that player, not Hamilton, is the season's pace car. That player is Los Angeles Dodgers second baseman Dee Gordon — the runaway stolen-base king and proxy for all our Hamilton-related fantasies.
Although Gordon entered the season projected to match Hamilton's offensive output — PECOTA had their True Averages separated by two points — the son of former major leaguer Tom Gordon lacked the promised playing time.
But Dee Gordon became the Dodgers' second baseman almost by default. Manager Don Mattingly lacked a better option at second, so he played Gordon, who played well and Mattingly continued to play him. Gordon's offensive numbers continue to represent an improvement over his past marks, albeit after some recent reversion to his old ways. This column is not about his offensive gains though.
Davey Lopes, the Rafiki of baserunning, told ESPN's Jerry Crasnick:
"He's a base stealer and there are guys who steal bases, and there's a big difference," Lopes said. "You'll see the value of a base stealer when he's taking attention away from the hitter and everybody is looking at that guy at first base. Teams will pitch out more or quicken their deliveries. Everybody knows you're going, and they still can't stop you."
Lopes stops himself before uttering the phrase "game changer," but he points in that direction. If Lopes had called Gordon a game changer, would he be wrong? Does Gordon not alter the pace, look and feel of a game when he's on base? And is Lopes not right that nobody can stop Gordon?
To find the answers, I reviewed each of Gordon's base-running opportunities from May 24-30, including the times he opted not to steal.
For a player described a few years ago as a raw, unrefined talent, Gordon shows surprising nuance on the basepaths. He often goes on or right after the first move, meaning he's not Coco Crisp — few are — yet pitchers were unable to catch Gordon leaning — and it wasn't due to a lack of trying.
True to Lopes' sentiment, the hitter sometimes felt like a secondary concern, behind keeping Gordon at first base. Most of the usual tricks were used to keep Gordon close:
• Throwing to the base for appearance's sake
• Legitimate pickoff tries
• Altering timing
• Stepping off the rubber
Philadelphia's David Buchanan threw to second on a daylight play where no daylight was visible. The ball skipped into the center-field dusk and Gordon easily advances.
Cincinnati's Jonathan Broxton faked the inside move. His teammate Homer Bailey tried the inverse of the fake inside move: Spinning toward first base and bluffing a throw. Opposing pitchers change their tempos, looks, throw velocities, and everything else they could to keep Gordon from stealing.
The unquestioned highlight of the week involved Reds ace Johnny Cueto, who stops more runners than shin splints. Cueto has picked off 11 baserunners since 2011, ranking eighth in the majors among pitchers with at least 500 innings. Since 2011, he's allowed just six stolen bases; everyone ahead of him has allowed at least twice that many.
Cueto is clever, devoted to his craft, and employs an arresting balk move. Stealing against Cueto is like pickpocketing a police officer.
Gordon did not try to steal second against Cueto for good reason. Cueto begins the sequence with a throw over. After a pitch, he does it again. This time it was closer.
A few pitches later, Cueto throws over once more, and might have caught Gordon with a more accurate throw.
All the while, Cueto is altering his timing and looks. He's holding the ball longer, taking an extra look, and doing everything he can to keep Gordon, who keeps creeping toward second base, from getting a read on an obvious pattern.
In the end, Cueto wins. Not only did he keep Gordon at first base for the duration of Carl Crawford's at-bat, but the right-hander prevented Gordon from scoring. Had Gordon reached second base, he would have crossed the plate standing up. As is, he went first-to-third in impressive fashion.
Gordon isn't even with the pitcher's mound when the ball touches grass. By the time outfielder Chris Heisey touches the ball, Gordon is around second and on his way to third. Heisey doesn't make an effort to get Gordon, and by the time the camera angle switches, Gordon is headed into third before the ball leaves Heisey's hand.
In addition to forcing pitchers like Cueto to empty their pockets, Gordon causes the defense to alter their formations. Baseball is in the midst of a shift revolution, where traditional positions are cast aside in favor of gaining an extra advantage.
Gordon forces the defense into unfavorable alignments. Infielders have to play in on double-play opportunities, and second basemen have to park near the bag in order to keep him close. Speed is often overrated in prospects. Gordon shows why it's desired.
So how does a pitcher stop Gordon?
Prevention is the easiest solution: Keep him off the bases. Otherwise, opponents have to hope he slips or overslides the bag. Otherwise, there is no real answer.
Even the three times Gordon has been caught reveal no effective strategies. Miami's Jarrod Saltalamacchia nabbed Gordon twice: Once because Gordon slid awkwardly into second, and the other because the pitch enabled Salty to make a quick transfer and a strong, accurate throw.
During the week-long observation, no battery attempted a backpick (catcher throwing to first base) or a pitchout. The likely reason for no backpicks is 24 of Gordon's 34 steals (through May 31's games) occurred on the first two pitches, including 13 on the first pitch.
The pitchout part is tougher to explain. If Gordon is going to run, the odds point toward him going early. It might not make the difference in most cases, but turning a 50-50 play into an out has value. At worst, it's a ball and a stolen base. At best, Gordon is retired or forced to reconsider running the next time he's on.
Until that doubt is placed in Gordon's head, he's going to continue to change games.
R.J. Anderson is an author of Baseball Prospectus
This article originally appeared on FOXsports.com